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RECENT CASES
AUTOMOBILES-LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURERS OR SELLERS-AUTO-
MOBILE MANUFACTURER'S LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT DESIGN-The plain-
tiff instituted this action to recover damages for personal injuries
received by him when the automobile in which he was riding was
struck in the rear by an automobile manufactured by the defend-
ant and being driven at a speed exceeding one hundred miles per
hour. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was negligent in its
design and manufacture of an automobile which was capable of
being driven at such a dangerous speed. The plaintiff appealed
from dismissal of the action for failure to state a claim upon which
relief might be granted. The Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit,
with one dissenting opinion, held that the automobile manufacturer
was not liable on the theory that the manufacturer had a duty to
design an automobile incapable of causing injury through foresee-
able misuse for a purpose for which the automobile was never
supplied. Schemel v. General Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 945 (1968).
Beginning with the landmark case, MctcPherson v. Buick Motor
Co.,1 courts have held that a manufacturer is liable for loss caused
by the negligent construction of an automobile.2 But in a number
of situations the automobile which is involved in the accident is
made as intended and no defect in construction exists. The auto-
mobile may be functioning perfectly after the accident. In this
type of case the plaintiff has attempted to show that loss was
caused by a negligent design.8 Here, too, in Schemel the plaintiff
was not alleging that some defect existed in the construction of
the automobile which prevented the driver from operating it at
a lesser speed. For example, there was no allegation that the ac-
celerator stuck or that a defect in the brakes caused the accident.
Obviously, if the plaintiff can show negligence in design he not
only has established the requisite fault but also that the defect
existed when the automobile left the manufacturer's hands. Whereas
if it is alleged that a particular item was defective in its construc-
tion, the plaintiff may be defeated for lack of proof that the alleged
1. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
2. Necaise v. Chrysler Corp., 335 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1964): Ford Motor Co. v.
Mathis, 322 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1963); Duckworth v. Ford Motor Co., 820 F.2d 130, 132
(3rd Cir. 1963) ; Northern v. General Motors Corp., 2 Utah 2d 9, 268 P.2d 981 (1954).
3. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); General Motors
Corp. v. Muncy, 367 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1037 (1967) ; Evans
v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966) cert. denied, 885 U.S. 836 (1966).
RECENT CASES
defect did not arise after some use (or misuse) while in the hands
of the ultimate consumer.4
The court in Schemel relies primarily on its previous decision
in Evans v. General Motors Corp.5 in which recovery was denied
because the use of the automobile was improper. The plaintiff's
decedent was killed when the left side of the automobile collapsed
on him after a collision with another automobile. The plaintiff
alleged that their automobile was designed with an "X" frame
which did not have side frame rails to protect a driver involved in
a side impact collision. The court in Evans made the following
observation:
The intended purpose of an automobile does not include
its participation in collisions with other objects despite the
manufacturer's ability to foresee the possibility that such
collisions may occur.8
Clearly, a collision is not an intended purpose of an automobile.
The underlying policy which the court in Evans seems to be pro-
moting is that an automobile manufacturer discharges his duty if
he produces a product designed to meet normal uses and he is
not required to anticipate abnormal uses. Evans refuses to extend
the responsibility of the manufacturer. The court states that the
manufacturer need not make its automobile "accident proof."'7
Following Evans, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Larsen
v. General Motors Corp.8 reversed and remanded a decision of
a Minnesota United States District Court which had given judgment
for General Motors Corporation. In Larsen the plaintiff received
personal injuries while driving a Chevrolet Corvair. A head-on col-
lision caused a severe rearward thrust of the steering mechanism
into the plaintiff's head. Liability was asserted against General
Motors Corporation on an alleged design defect in the steering
assembly.0 General Motors, relying on Evans, contended that it
had no duty to produce a vehicle in which it would be safe to
collide. The court, however, expanded the duty of the automobile
manufacturer. The court delcared the duty to be one of reasonable
care in the design of its vehicle and to avoid subjecting the user
to an unreasonable risk of injury in the event of a collision. 10 The
4. See generally Noel, Recent Trends in Manufacturers' Negligence as to Design,
Instructions, or Warnings, 19 Sw. L. J. 48 (1965).
5. Supra note 3.
6. Evans v. General Motors Corp., aupra note 8, at 826.
7. Evans v. General Motors Corp., supra note 3, at 824.
8. Supra note 3.
9. The plaintiff alleged that the design and placement of the steering shaft exposed
the driver to an unreasonable risk of injury. In effect, the shaft acted as a spear aimed
at a vital -Dart of the driver's anatomy. The plaintiff contended that because of the design
defect he received injuries that he would not have otherwise received. Or In the alter-
native, he alleged that his injuries would not have been as severe.
10. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., supra note 3, at 502.
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court in Larsen circumvented Evans by stating that while auto-
mobiles are not made for the purpose of colliding with one another,
this is a frequent and inevitable contingency of normal automobile
use."
It is interesting to note that in Evans and Larsen the facts are
quite similar; yet, two different results are reached. The facts
are similar since in both cases it was not contended by the plaintiff
that the alleged design defect caused the accident. In both, the
cause of the accident was a collision and the alleged design defect
only increased the severity of the injuries.
Commencing with the year 1957 many automobiles were pro-
duced with extreme and exaggerated tail fins on which certain
unfortunate pedestrians became impaled. No duty was found owing
to the pedestrians by the automobile manufacturers for this alleged
negligent design.12 In the area of non-automobile design litigation,
however, the manufacturers have been held liable for harm caused
by the product when it is used not for its intended purpose but for
some other purpose which the manufacturer might have reasonably
foreseen."s
Certainly, it is also foreseeable that the automobile manufac-
turer's product may be driven into bodies of water. Then under
the plaintiff's reasoning in Schemel the manufacturer would have
a duty to equip its automobiles with pontoons. 14 In the instant case
it is also foreseeable that irresponsible motorists will operate their
vehicles at unlawful and excessive speeds, but the court refuses
to confer a duty upon the defendant manufacturer to design its
automobiles with governors.
While the courts have been willing to protect users of auto-
mobiles from negligent construction, " this willingness to protect
has not extended into the area of negligent design. 6 Cases in which
11. rd. at 502.
12. Kahn v. Chrysler Corp., 221 F.Supp. 677 (S.D. Tex. 1963); Hatch v. Ford Motor
Co., 163 Cal. App.2d 393, 329 P.2d 605 (Ct. App. 1958). Both cases involved minors
colliding with a parked automobile. In Hatch the minor collided with the radiator or-
nament; in Kahn, the minor collided with the rear tail fin. Both courts denied liability
as a matter of law for the alleged negligent design.
13. Blohm v. Cardwell Mfg. Co., 880 F.2d 841 (10th Cir. 1967) (collapsible mobile
derrick rig) ; Spruill v. Boyle-Midway Inc., 808 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962) (furniture polish) ;
Phillips v. Ogle Aluminum Furniture, Inc., 106 Cal. ADp.2d 650, 235 P.2d 857 (Ct. App.
1951) (Chair); cf. Brown v. General Motors Corp., 355 F.2d 814 (4th Cir. 1966). aert.
dentied, 386 U.S. 1036 (1966) (bulldozer).
14. This was one of General Motors' arguments in the Evans case. While this par-
ticular breach .of duty has not yet been alleged, interestingly enough, a year after Etan
was decided, an unsuccessful plaintiff in a lower court brought an action against General
Motors on the theory that it had a duty to design an automobile that would be fireproof
after a collision. Shumard v. General Motors Corp.. 270 F.Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
15. Supra note 2.
16. Evans v. General Motors Corp., eupra note 8; General Motors Corp. v. Munoy,
supra note 3. Contra Larsen v. General Motors Corp., supra note S.
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plaintiffs have had more success in negligent design litigation have
involved not automobiles but other various "motor vehicles.' 11
The courts perhaps feel a reluctance to let a jury comprised
of laymen evaluate and judge the product design conceived and
produced by experts in the field. If this is so, the argument is not
particularly cogent as juries have decided other cases involving
expert testimony and presumably have reached a just result. If
the courts are reluctant to find the manufacturer liable for fear
of the burden of increased cost to the manufacturer, that cost
would no doubt be passed on to the ultimate consumer anyway
through the increased prices of automobiles.5
The feeling on the part of some courts is that if liability for
negligence in design is to be extended this is a responsibility for
the legislature to assume. 19 Indeed the legislature has assumed
some of this responsibility. In 1966 the President signed into law
the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. 20 The stated
purpose of the Act is to reduce traffic accidents and deaths
and injuries to persons resulting from traffic accidents.2 1 The Act
empowers the Secretary of Commerce 22 to prescribe appropriate
and objective motor vehicle standards. 2 Compliance with the stand-
ards by the manufacturer, however, will not settle the question
of common law liability24 but the violation of these minimum
standards might be evidence of failure to use due care. That Con-
gress contemplated the problem of automobile design is clearly
reflected in Section 1391 of the Act. 25 The judiciary will be faced
with the question of negligent design in any case in which the
prescribed standards are not met; also, in any case in which the
standards are perhaps inadequate.
North Dakota, in a case decided in 1965, recognized a plaintiff's
claim for negligence in construction against a truck-tractor manu-
facturer.2 In another case involving a suit against the manufacturer
17. Carpini v. Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus Co., 216 F.2d 404 (3rd Cir. 1954) (bus) ;
Clark v. Zurich Truck Lines, 844 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961) (truck); but see
Gossett v. Chrysler Corp., 359 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1966) (truck).
18. See generally 52 IA. L. REV. 956 (1966-1967).
19. Evans v. General Motors Corp., suvrG note 3, at 824; Shummard v. General Motors
Corp., supra note 14, at 313.
20. 80 Stat. 718, 15 U.S.C. § 1381-1425 (Supp. II. 1967).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 1381 (Supp. 11, 1967).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1395 (Supp. II, 1967), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1652 (f) (1) (Supp.
II, 1967). The Secretary of Transportation now carries out the provisions of the Act
through the National Traffic Safety Bureau.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1392 (a) (Supp. JI, 1967).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1397 (c) (Supp. 1I, 1967).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1391 (Supp. II, 1967). "Motor Vehicle Safety means the performance
of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment in such a manner that the public is pro-
tected against unreasonable risk of accidents occuring as a result of the devign, con-
struction or performance of motor vehicles .... "
26. Lang v. General Motors Corp., 136 N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1965). Plaintiff purchased
a new 1960 Chevrolet 2% ton truck tractor from one of the defendant manufacturer'es
dealers. Plaintiff alleged negligence in the manufacture and construction of the vehicle
and also breach of warranty. The North Dakota Supreme Court said that plaintiffs
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of a potato harvesting machine, the court does indicate in its
opinion that the duty of a manufacturer extends to product design.27
Automobile design reflects a basic public policy question. The
design of a complex product such as an automobile takes into
account safety of operation. However, this safety objective competes
with other public demands of the manufacturer's product. These
demands are economy, style, and speed and performance. It seems
that if Schemel's case had gone to the jury that causation would
have been extremely difficult to prove. Arguably, the driver of
the automobile manufactured by General Motors Corporation could
be considered an intervening force cutting off the chain of causation.
Perhaps it would be desirable to restrict the speed and perform-
ance capabilities of an automobile as suggested by the plaintiff
in Schemel. However, it is doubtful that the judiciary will ever
impose the duty. Clearly, the legislature has not chosen to do so. 28
RICHARD N. JEFFRIES
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS-MAL-
PRACTIcE-Two doctors performed a Caesarean section operation
on the plaintiff, and left a surgical sponge inside her body. Believing
she had a tumor, the plaintiff underwent surgery more than four
years later, and the sponge was then discovered. The plaintiff
filed suit for malpractice against the doctors, but the District
Court, Lubbock County, granted defendant's motion for a summary
judgment based on the two-year Statute of Limitations. This judg-
ment was affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court of Texas, two
judges dissenting,1 reversed the judgments of the trial and ap-
pellate courts, and remanded the cause for trial. The court held
that the Statute of Limitations does not commence to run until
the cause of action is discovered, rather than when the negligence
occurred. Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1967).
The primary question raised in this case is whether the Statute
of Limitations regarding a malpractice action begins to run at the
time of the operation, or at the time the negligent act is dis-
complaint did state a cause of action on either a theory of negligence or implied war-
ranty. The main issue In the case, however, concerned the manufacturer's defense of
privity of contract which the court did not allow.
27. Lindenberg v. Folson, 138 N.W.2d 573 (N.D. 1965).
28. 33 Fed. Reg. 6465-6470 (1968). Some of the recent safety standards have to do
with the following: door latches, hinges, and locks; windshield wiping and washing
systems; windshield defrosting and defogging systems; headlamp concealment devices;
and hood latch systems.
1. Griffin and Walker, J. Griffin stated that to adopt the discovery doctrine would
lead to hopeless confusion and destroy the "cut-off" point which the legislature had
already established. He felt that the court had no right to pass leglslatlon to Change
the Statute of Limitations.
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